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Biometric Data Regulation and the Right of
Publicity: A Path to Regaining Autonomy
Over Our Commodified Identity
Lisa Raimondi
16 U. MASS. L. REV. 198

ABSTRACT
This Note explores how a right of publicity action might be used to address presentday concerns regarding biometric data ownership rights where an individual’s
likeness can essentially be bought and sold. As social networking and use of the
internet has grown, so has the opportunity for people to engage with others and share
their lives. However, that opportunity also comes with risk. More and more, people
are required to accept the terms of use and privacy policies detailing how their
biometric data will be collected and stored if they want to download and use certain
technological applications. Most of these applications are offered to the public free
of charge, so how is it these companies continue to increase their revenue? This Note
purports that the users’ biometric data stands as a bargaining chip that is shared with
tech companies in exchange for use of their product. After the companies collect this
biometric data, it is sold for profit. By this very act it is proven that a person’s
likeness has commercial value— and should not be misappropriated for another’s
benefit. At the time of this Note, a few U.S. states have enacted biometric data
regulations, but in the majority of states, consumers remain vulnerable. This is where
the common law right of publicity comes in, as a potential vehicle to help everyday
citizens regain control over their likeness, or at minimum, receive compensation
where it is misused. Biometric data regulation is in its nascent stage and the extent of
damage resulting from the individual’s loss of control over their biometric data is as
yet unknown, but this Note endeavors to work out a possible avenue to regain control
over commodified identity.
AUTHOR’S NOTE
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Roses are red
Violets are blue
When the product is free
The product is you.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s modern world, individuals are essentially compelled to
engage with social media and smart technology in order to maintain
their social circles, professional presence, or even romantic
relationships.2 This is not to say that online engagement is necessarily
a burden. Arguably, technological advancements have made lives
easier and more secure.3 Yet, ironically, these same advancements can
bring serious risks regarding the security of sensitive biometric data.4
1

2

3

4

Matt Cagle (@Matt_Cagle), TWITTER (Feb. 14, 2019, 11:47 PM),
https://twitter.com/Matt_Cagle/status/1096269666412986373 [https://perma.cc/
HLU6-HXFJ].
See Lee Rainie, Americans’ Complicated Feelings About Social Media in an Era
of Privacy Concerns, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.
org/fact-tank/2018/03/27/americans-complicated-feelings-about-social-mediain-an-era-of-privacy-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/GAA4-6VCM] (survey
showing Americans’ conflicting feelings about the essential nature of an internet
presence versus privacy concerns); New Poll: Americans Overwhelmingly
Support Existing Net Neutrality Rules, Affordable Access, and Competition
Among ISPs, FREEDMAN CONSULTING, LLC 1–2 (July 10, 2017),
https://tfreedmanconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Tech-Policy-PollSummary-Final_20170710.pdf [https://perma.cc/N493-PXWC] (2017 poll
showing that a broad majority of Americans believe the internet is essential to
their everyday lives).
For example, the use of facial recognition or fingerprint recognition software to
authenticate identity for security purposes. See Kristine Hamann and Rachel
Smith, Facial Recognition Technology: Where Will It Take Us?, A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/publications/criminaljustice-magazine/2019/spring/facial-recognition-technology/
[https://perma.cc/L5D6-M8FT].
See Slobodan Ribarić & Nikola Pavešić, De-identification for Privacy
Protection in Biometrics, in USER-CENTRIC PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN
BIOMETRICS 293, 295 (Claus Vielhauer ed., 2017) (“There are two different
approaches to the relation between privacy and biometrics technology. The first
approach is based on the assumption that biometrics protects privacy and
information integrity by restricting access to personal information. The second
approach is based on the belief that biometrics technology introduces new
privacy threats . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
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Biometric data generally refers to the unique physiological or
behavioral characteristics that both identify and distinguish us from all
other persons, e.g. fingerprints or facial scan.5
Many individuals, either willingly or unwittingly, have exchanged
their highly valuable data for the ability to use the services of
companies like tech giants Google and Facebook. While there has
been a nationwide push to strengthen data privacy laws to include
biometric data,6 specific protections to address ongoing ownership of
identity are largely absent. As it stands, once a person consents to
share their biometric data, they may be powerless to restore exclusive
ownership.7 However, there are data protection models, both in Europe
and most recently in the state of California, that may adequately
address these autonomy concerns.8
Part II of this Note discusses the timely and controversial topic of
biometric data, the reason for its value, and which entities use it. Part
III describes the disparate state privacy laws relating to the use of
biometric data—most prominent in Illinois, Texas, and Washington.
Part IV will briefly look to the historic roots of the right of publicity
and its progenitor, the right of privacy,9 and end with the present-day
hodge-podge collection of right of publicity statutes littered across the
U.S. This sets the stage to theorize how a reimagined right of
publicity, coupled with the dignitary right of privacy, might address
5
6

7

8

9

Id. at 294.
See, e.g., H.R. 72, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2017); H.R. 350, 149th Gen.
Assemb. (Del. 2018); S. 120, 191st Sess. (Mass. 2019); H.R. 5019, 99th Leg.
Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2017); S. 1203, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). It should be noted
that some states, while not always adopting a separate statute dedicated to
biometric privacy, have “expanded how they define ‘personal information’
under their state data breach notification laws to include biometric
information . . . .” Chris Brook, Biometric Privacy Legislation Catching on
Across America, DIGITAL GUARDIAN: DATA INSIDER (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://digitalguardian.com/blog/biometric-privacy-legislation-catching-acrossamerica [https://perma.cc/H5MY-C7GN].
See Alan S. Wernick, Biometric Information – Permanent Personally
Identifiable Information Risk, A.B.A. (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/business_law/publications/committee_newsletters/bcl/2019/201902/f
a_8/ [https://perma.cc/UAZ8-3XYY].
Biometrics: definition, trends, use cases, laws and latest news, THALES (Sept.
10, 2020) https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/markets/digital-identity-andsecurity/government/inspired/biometrics [https://perma.cc/T24H-ABC3]
[hereinafter Biometrics Review].
Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67
U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 234 (2005).
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current biometric data concerns. Part V first turns the focus overseas to
Europe and then westward to California to examine how other data
privacy regulations might help reinstate autonomy over biometric data.
The conclusion in Part VI reviews the current U.S. and European data
regulation landscapes and asserts that whether those regulations
succeed or fail, a re-imagined right of publicity can serve as a
secondary protection over our newly commodified identity.
II. BIOMETRIC DATA – WHAT IS IT WORTH AND TO WHOM DOES IT
HAVE WORTH?
Biometric data is often divided into two categories: physiological
and behavioral.10 Physiological biometrics are the more permanent,
unique, physical attributes of a person that typically remain unaffected
by outside stress and time, such as fingerprints, the shape of the face or
hand, and iris scans.11 Behavioral biometrics typically include “voice
recognition, signature dynamics (speed of movement of pen,
accelerations, pressure exerted, inclination), keystroke dynamics, the
way we use objects, gait, the sound of steps, gestures, etc.”12
A. The Marketability of Biometric Data and User Concerns
Because biometric data provides a quick and reliable method of
identifying individuals or authenticating their identity,13 the value of
the “biometric system market” has skyrocketed and is projected to
almost double in size “from USD 33.0 billion in 2019 to USD 65.3
billion by 2024.”14 The gargantuan size of the biometric system market
yields strong implications for both users and companies,15 and not
always for the better.16 In 2018, the University of Texas at Austin’s
Center for Identity conducted a survey detailing consumer attitudes
10
11
12
13
14

15
16

See Biometrics Review, supra note 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Biometric System Market - Global Forecast to 2024, MKTS. AND MKTS. (Oct.
2019), https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/next-generationbiometric-technologies-market-697.html [https://perma.cc/SH9T-5XA7].
See Biometrics Review, supra note 8.
New Survey on Biometric Technology Shows Consumers Are OK with Some
Forms and Wary of Others, UT NEWS: CAMPUS & COMMUNITY (May 3, 2018),
https://news.utexas.edu/2018/05/03/new-survey-on-consumer-attitudes-towardbiometric-technology/ [https://perma.cc/H7PX-2SHT].
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toward biometrics and their comfort level with its various uses.17 The
survey showed that “58 percent of those surveyed [said] they [felt]
very comfortable with fingerprint scanning biometrics. Only about a
third reported feeling very comfortable with any other biometric type.
Survey respondents were most unsure about facial recognition
technology, with 13 percent feeling ‘not at all comfortable’ . . . .”18
This discomfort likely results from the absence of an overarching
standard across the U.S. to regulate how companies store and collect
the data, and the lack of concrete protection against its unauthorized
use.19 Additionally, “people struggle to understand the nature and
scope of the data collected about them. Just 9% believe they have ’a
lot of control’ over the information that is collected[.]”20 Transparency
as to what data is collected, who collects the data, and for what
purpose is sorely lacking.
B. Efforts of Companies to Self-Regulate due to Consumer
Concerns
In the absence of an expansive biometric data privacy right, some
companies have made efforts to self-regulate and appear more
transparent with their privacy policies;21 however, this effort leaves
17
18

19

20
21

Id.
Id.; see also Rachel L. German & K. Suzanne Barber, Consumer Attitudes About
Biometric Authentication, U. TEX. AUSTIN: CTR. FOR IDENTITY 15 (May 2018),
https://identity.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/202009/Consumer%20Attitudes%20About%20Biometrics.pdf [https://perma.cc/E22
Y-PVPP] (This is the survey referenced within the article supra note 16.).
Carra Pope, Note, Biometric Data Collection in an Unprotected World:
Exploring the Need for Federal Legislation Protecting Biometric Data, 26 J.L.
& POL’Y 769, 783–84 (2018).
Rainie, supra note 2.
See Apple Platform Security: Introduction to Apple Platform Security, APPLE,
https://support.apple.com/guide/security/introduction-seccd5016d31/web
[https:// perma.cc/AB7Q-Z6PL]. Surprisingly, Apple’s use of biometric
identifiers in the authentication services used by its products do not bring the
same associated risks that one would expect when one needs to scan their face
almost 20 times per day. The simple reason being that Apple never shares your
facial mapping template with any third party because the data is strictly housed
within the tangible phone on a secure server. Apple Platform Security: Facial
Matching, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/guide/security/facial-matchingsece151358d1/web [https://perma.cc/B2JW-QWTX]. Even when Apple allows
you to use Face ID to access or authenticate your identity in third-party apps, the
third-party app never has access to your Face ID, rather “the app is notified only
as to whether the authentication was successful; it can’t access Touch ID, Face
ID, or the data associated with the enrolled user.” Apple Platform Security:

204

UMass Law Review

v. 16 | 198

much to be desired.22 Google, for instance, has its privacy policy set
across multiple pages that requires constant clicks and scrolls.23
Though the privacy policies on Google’s web page are not written in
complex legalese or unbearably small font, the language is ambiguous
and often leaves out explanations of certain policies requiring yet
another click to access them.24 Add a Google Nest system to the user’s
household and there is a separate series of privacy and data policy

22

23
24

Other Uses for Touch ID and Face ID, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/guide/s
ecurity/other-uses-for-touch-id-and-face-id-sec50f82ec35/1/web/1
[https://perma.cc/4PZT-6HQS].
Romain Dillet, French Data Protection Watchdog Fines Google $57 Million
Under the GDPR, TECH CRUNCH (Jan. 21, 2019, 10:46 AM), https://techcrunch.
com/2019/01/21/french-data-protection-watchdog-fines-google-57-millionunder-the-gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/59KN-EKCN].
Id.
See Our Commitment to Privacy in the Home, GOOGLE,
https://store.google.com/category/google_nest_privacy [https://perma.cc/7UAT6CHF?type=image] (“We’ll also more clearly explain what types of information
these sensors send to Google, as well as examples of how we use that
information, to help you better understand their purpose.”).
Additionally, see an excerpt from Google’s Nest Privacy Policy:
In addition to the data described in the Privacy Policy, when you
use our connected home devices and services, we save: . . . Audio
and video data from devices with cameras and microphones, and
information derived from this data, such as facial recognition
information (if you’ve set up this feature), and person, object,
sound, motion or activity detection information, all subject to your
permissions and settings. For example, we store your video footage
if you choose to receive video storage services from Google for
your Nest Cams.
....
Device usage data is also collected when a device is used with a
Google service . . . such as voice or touch interactions, long presses
on the device, or other device interactions or adjustments,
including related device state, settings, and features used.
FAQs on Privacy: Google Nest, GOOGLE NEST, https://support.google.com/goog
lenest/answer/9415830?co=GENIE.Platform%3DAndroid&hl=en
[https://perma.cc/2CJ6-CPQR] (select the first option entitled “What types of
data are collected when I use Google Nest’s connected home devices and
services?” under the heading “Information Google collects”).
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pages to click through.25 Eventually, the site states that Google Nest
and Google Home (in accordance with user preferences) can collect
and store video, audio, and behavioral biometric data.26 However,
Google does provide an opt-out option and an option to delete the
recordings manually—though this process involves additional
clicking, scrolling, and searching.27
Conversely, Smule, an American mobile app developer with a
popular singing app of the same name, is relatively transparent about
the data it can collect within its Privacy Policy:
To be clear, we don’t ask you to provide us with any sensitive
personal information, such as information relating to your race or
ethnic origin . . . [or your] genetic or biometric information . . . .
However, if you decide to share this kind of information on Smule
Services, you explicitly consent to us displaying it or sharing it in
accordance with your selection.28

While it is true that Smule does not explicitly ask users to provide
them with biometric data, in the form of uploaded video and audio
content, it does compel users to consent to Smule sharing that data
once it is uploaded.29 Otherwise, Smule instructs users to leave the site
immediately: “[i]f you do not agree to this Agreement or to the use of
your personal information in accordance with our Privacy Policy, do
not click on one of the ‘Account Creation Options’ . . . and do not
access or otherwise use any portion of the Service.”30
C. Use of Biometric Data in Security and the Non-Commercial
Realm
It is worthwhile to note how companies and public bodies utilize
biometric data. Individuals, companies, and governments alike use

25

26
27
28

29

30

FAQs
on
Privacy:
Google
Nest,
GOOGLE
NEST,
https://support.google.com/googlenest/answer/9415830?co=GENIE.Platform%3
DAndroid&hl=en [https://perma.cc/2CJ6-CPQR].
Id.
Id.
Privacy Policy, SMULE, https://www.smule.com/en/privacy
[https://perma.cc/BF7J-3C65]. The terms and conditions also allow revocation
of consent and deletion of account, albeit with stipulations that Smule has
discretion over when it is deleted. Id.
Smule Terms of Service, SMULE, https://www.smule.com/en/termsofservice
[https://perma.cc/792D-K8FK].
Id.
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biometric software for non-commercial and security purposes.31 For
example, retail business owners use facial recognition technology to
identify shoplifters32 and daycare centers have long employed the use
of fingerprint scanners to ensure only registered parents access the
center.33 Recently, a non-commercial biometric identifier software,
FakeApp AI, garnered some attention when viral videos demonstrated
that any person with access to the software could make a video and,
through the use of photoshop and facial-mapping technology, don the
face of a famous person to fool the audience into believing it was the
celebrity depicted.34 Additionally, law enforcement agencies in the
U.S. have been collecting biometric data from citizens since the
implementation of fingerprinting and in this aspect there is no
substantive commercial use employed.35 The purpose behind biometric
data collection by the Federal Bureau of Investigation was, and is, to
use the data to correctly identify suspects (e.g. through fingerprint

31

32
33

34

35

Clare Garvie, Facial Recognition Is Here. The iPhone X is Just the Beginning,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 13, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentis
free/2017/sep/13/facial-recognition-iphone-x-privacy [https://perma.cc/RVE6GRDA].
Id.
See T’ash Spenser, Daycare Centers Using Biometrics to Protect Kids,
BIOMETRICUPDATE.COM (July 26, 2012), https://www.biometricupdate.com/201
207/daycare-centers-using-biometrics-to-protect-kids [https://perma.cc/75NX5HXY].
See David Singer & Camila Connolly, How Hollywood Can (and Can’t) Fight
Back Against Deepfake Videos, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Sept. 7, 2019, 9:59 AM),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/how-hollywood-can-can-t-fightback-deepfake-videos-guest-column-1237685 [https://perma.cc/ZHB9-6N3N];
Brian Higgins, At the Intersection of AI, Face Swapping, Deep Fakes, Right of
Publicity, and Litigation, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECH. & L. (June 17, 2018),
http://aitechnologylaw.com/2018/06/at-the-intersection-of-ai-face-swappingdeep-fakes-right-of-publicity-and-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/X4MQ-9JLD]. In
April 2018, a “deepfake” video featured comedian Jordan Peele using the AI
software, donning the face of Former President Barack Obama, to deliver a
public service announcement to people about the use of the software and
possible subsequent fake news affect it would have, especially come election
time. James Vincent, Watch Jordan Peele Use AI to Make Barack Obama
Deliver a PSA About Fake News, VERGE (Apr. 17, 2018, 1:14 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/tldr/2018/4/17/17247334/ai-fake-news-video-barackobama-jordan-peele-buzzfeed [https://perma.cc/52RC-SYJ7].
See Fingerprints and Other Biometrics, FBI,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-and-other-biometrics
[https://perma.cc/84FL-QRL9].
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detection) to further the Bureau’s security goals.36 However, in early
2019 the use of facial recognition software was banned in the city of
San Francisco as an anti-surveillance ordinance measure.37 Although
law enforcement has traditionally supported using new software to
address safety concerns, their interests were no match for the outcry
against facial recognition and its civil rights implications, citing the
technology for its bias and poor track record of misidentifying people
of color.38
III. CURRENT DISPARATE STATE BIOMETRIC PRIVACY STATUTES
Multiple states have legislation pending before their respective
legislatures that focus on providing protection for user control over
biometric data.39 This section, however, will focus primarily on states
whose biometric privacy laws are already in full effect: Illinois,40
Texas,41 and Washington.42 These states have not simply broadened

36
37

38

39
40

41

42

Id.
See Rachel Metz, San Francisco Just Banned Facial-Recognition Technology,
CNN: BUSINESS (May 14, 2019, 7:15 PM), https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/14/t
ech/san-francisco-facial-recognition-ban/index.html [https://perma.cc/H4FHJ5WB].
Id. Recently, Amazon’s “Rekognition” software came under fire from its
investors who did not think it was wise to aggressively market the surveillance
software to law enforcement because it implicated civil rights issues.
Shareholders have introduced two proposals on facial recognition
for a vote. One asks the company to prohibit sales of its facial
recognition system, called Amazon Rekognition, to government
agencies, unless its board concludes that the technology does not
facilitate human rights violations. The other asks the company to
commission an independent report examining the extent to which
Rekognition may threaten civil, human and privacy rights, and the
company’s finances.
Natasha Singer, Amazon Faces Investor Pressure Over Facial Recognition,
N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2019, at B1.
See sources cited supra note 6 and accompanying text.
Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1–99
(2020).
Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier (“CUBI”), TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 503.001 (West 2019).
Biometric Identifiers (“BI”), WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010–.040 (2020). See
also Biometric Data and Data Protection Regulations (GDPR and CCPA),
THALES (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/markets/digital-
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their data security breach laws to include biometric data, but have
passed statutes designed specifically for the regulation of biometric
data.43 Although all three statutes regulate the collection, use, and
security of biometric data, they differ in certain regards. Key
differences to note are (1) the types of biometric data the statute
protects and what it excludes; (2) the prohibited and/or allowable
purpose or use of an individual’s biometric data; and (3) who may
bring suit.
A. First of Its Kind: The Illinois BIPA
The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) was the
first state biometric privacy statute, entering the scene in 2008.44 The
statute protects biometric information such as: “a retina or iris scan,
fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry.”45 The
statute excludes, inter alia, “writing samples, written signatures,
photographs, . . . tattoo descriptions” and “physical descriptions such
as height [or] weight,” from protection; nor does it “include
information derived from” these excluded identifiers.46
While the BIPA does not apply to government entities, it does
apply to private businesses or corporations, allowing them to “collect,
capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a
person’s” biometric identifier once they have informed the individual
in writing that: (1) the individual’s “information is being collected or
stored”; (2) “the specific purpose and length of term” for which the
individual’s information is being used; and (3) the entity must also
obtain a written release signed by the individual.47 A person in
possession of another’s biometric information is prohibited from
selling, disclosing, redisclosing, or otherwise disseminating “a
person’s . . . biometric identifier” unless the individual whose data it is

43

44
45
46
47

identity-and-security/government/biometrics/biometric-data
[https://perma.cc/6DFX-T39A].
Hannah Zimmerman, The Data of You: Regulating Private Industry’s Collection
of Biometric Information, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 637, 648 (2018); see also Molly
K. McGinley et al., The Biometric Bandwagon Rolls On: Biometric Legislation
Proposed Across the United States, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www
.natlawreview.com/article/biometric-bandwagon-rolls-biometric-legislationproposed-across-united-states [https://perma.cc/ZUG3-ZBKN].
BIPA, 740 14/1–99.
Id. at 14/10.
Id.
Id. at 14/15(b).
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consents to the disclosure.48 The private entity is required to “store,
transmit, and protect” all biometric data from disclosure with a
reasonable standard of care typical of their industry and in the same
fashion they would secure “other confidential and sensitive
information.”49 A cause of action under BIPA can be pursued by
“[a]ny person aggrieved by a violation of this Act.”50 The aggrieved is
entitled to recover damages ranging from approximately $1,000 to
$5,000, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.51
Since the statute’s inception in 2008, there has been substantial
development of BIPA case law, perhaps because the statute allows
citizens to file complaints on their own. There are two cases worth
noting: Patel v. Facebook, Inc.52 and Rosenbach v. Six Flags
Entertainment Corp.53
1. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp.: What it
Means to Be “Aggrieved”
In Rosenbach, the plaintiff, a minor teen, picked up a Six Flags
season pass that his mother had purchased for him online.54 When he
collected his pass he was instructed to provide his “thumbprint” in
accordance with the amusement parks’ procedures for season passholders.55 After scanning his thumb and returning home, he informed
his mother of the fingerprinting.56 Ms. Rosenbach was never informed
that the park would collect her minor son’s biometric data; she was not
provided information about how the data was stored, for what purpose,
and for how long; nor had she given express consent to the collection
of her son’s data.57 The Illinois Appellate Court found in favor of the
48

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id. at 14/15(d)(1). This sentence only describes one exclusion, but there are
three other exclusions to when a private entity may be permitted to disclose an
individual’s biometric identifiers, for example, if the disclosure completes a
financial transaction requested or authorized by the individual; when compelled
by state or federal law or municipal ordinance; or the disclosure is made
pursuant to a valid warrant or subpoena. Id. at 14/15(d)(2)-(4).
Id. at 14/15(e)(1)-(2).
Id. at 14/20.
Id. at 14/20(1)-(4).
Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019).
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 Ill 123186.
Id. at ⁋ 5.
Id. at ⁋ 6.
Id. at ⁋ 7–8.
Id. at ⁋ 8.
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defendant theme park who argued that in order to receive a remedy
under the statute, the plaintiff must have plead some actual injury or
harm “beyond infringement of the rights afforded them under the
law.”58 However, the Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with this
finding, particularly because of the unambiguous language in the
statute,59 which included a detailed statement of legislative intent.60
The court reasoned, “[w]hen the statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, we may not depart from the law’s terms by reading into
it exceptions, limitations, or conditions the legislature did not
express . . . .”61 Aggrieved is commonly defined as “suffering from an
infringement or denial of legal rights.”62 Thus, a more stringent
requirement of actual harm or adverse effect would be inconsistent
with the straightforward legislative intent in protecting a person’s right
of privacy.63
2. Patel v. Facebook, Inc: The Latest Victory for BIPA
In Patel, the class action plaintiffs brought suit against the tech
giant, Facebook, for BIPA violations.64 Facebook had—through its
Tag Suggestions feature—scanned and collected the face templates of
users via its facial recognition software and stored the biometric data
on its servers.65 Facebook did not inform the plaintiffs of the
collection, obtain their written consent, or maintain a retention
schedule as required by the statute. 66
The court in Patel, held that plaintiffs had sufficient Article III
standing under BIPA because the “statutory provisions at issue were
established to protect [the plaintiffs’] concrete interests,” namely their
privacy.67 The Ninth Circuit recognized that the right of privacy was
“traditionally . . . regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit . . . .”68
58
59
60
61
62

63
64
65
66
67
68

Id. at ⁋ 38.
Id.
BIPA, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(a)-(g) (2020).
Rosenbach, 2019 Ill 123186 ⁋ 24.
Id. at ⁋ 32 (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 25 (11th
ed. 2006)).
Id. at ⁋ 37.
Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1268 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id.
Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1271.
Id. at 1273 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)).
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Furthermore, when bolstered by recent Supreme Court jurisprudence
citing that privacy concerns are amplified by technological
advancements in monitoring systems, the court concluded “that an
invasion of an individual’s biometric privacy rights ‘has a close
relationship to a harm’” giving rise to a lawsuit.69 Additionally, the
court found “concrete and particularized harm” where violations of the
procedures in BIPA can actually harm or pose a material risk of harm
to substantive privacy interests. 70
B. One Year Later, Here Comes Texas: CUBI
In 2009, “Texas became the second state to pass a law protecting
citizens’ biometric data.”71 The Texas Capture or Use of Biometric
Identifier statute (“CUBI”), while relatively similar to BIPA, has key
differences. CUBI protects biometric identifiers, such as “retina or iris
scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or record of hand or face geometry[,]”
and does not name any exclusions.72 CUBI allows for the collection of
biometric data of an individual for a commercial purpose, provided the
person receives notice of this purpose and consents to its use (though a
writing is not required).73 Although CUBI prohibits a person who
possesses the biometric information of another to engage in a thirdparty transfer, there are certain enumerated exceptions to this
prohibition.74 Perhaps the biggest difference between the Texas CUBI
statute and the Illinois BIPA statute is that CUBI does not allow for a
private right of action; it is only actionable via the state’s Attorney
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id. (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)).
Id. at 1275.
Pope, supra note 19, at 791.
CUBI, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(a) (West 2019).
Id. § 503.001(b).
The exceptions are as follows:
A person who possesses a biometric identifier of an individual that
is captured for a commercial purpose: (1) may not sell, lease, or
otherwise disclose the biometric identifier to another person
unless: (A) the individual consents to the disclosure for
identification purposes in the event of the individual’s
disappearance or death; (B) the disclosure completes a financial
transaction that the individual requested or authorized; (C) the
disclosure is required or permitted by a federal statute or by a state
statute . . . (D) the disclosure is made by or to a law enforcement
agency for a law enforcement purpose in response to a
warrant . . . .
Id. § 503.001(c)(1)(A)-(D).
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General, who can pursue up to $25,000 per violation.75 Additionally,
CUBI requires biometric data be destroyed within one year of its
collection,76 whereas BIPA provides a longer, three-year window.77 To
date, there are no published actions under CUBI.
C. Washington Makes Three: Biometric Identifiers
Last, but not least, Washington passed its own biometric data
privacy statute (“BI”), which went into effect in July of 2017. In
similar fashion to Illinois, Washington included a statement of
legislative intent at the forefront of its statute. The “finding of intent”
section reads: “[t]he legislature finds that citizens of Washington are
increasingly asked to disclose sensitive biological information that
uniquely identifies them for commerce, security, and convenience. The
collection and marketing of biometric information . . . is of increasing
concern.” 78 Through this section the legislature makes clear its intent
to require businesses to first obtain the consent of users prior to
“enrolling” their identity into any database, provide notice of this
enrollment, and disclose how the biometric data collected will be
used.79
Like CUBI, Washington’s statute is only actionable by the
Attorney General.80 Additionally, it has a broader definition of what is
considered protected biometric data, but provides for exclusions to this
definition such as “physical or digital photograph, video or audio
recording or data generated therefrom[.]”81 The most notable
difference distinguishing the Washington statute from Illinois and
Texas is the broad exclusion of liability for entities that enroll and
collect biometrics “in furtherance of a security purpose.”82 “‘Security
purpose’ means the purpose of preventing shoplifting, fraud, or any
other misappropriation or theft of a thing of value, including tangible
and intangible goods, services, and other purposes in furtherance of
protecting the security or integrity of software, accounts, applications,

75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id. § 503.001(d).
Id. § 503.001(c)(3).
BIPA, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(a).
BI, WASH. REV. CODE. § 19.375.900 (2020).
Id.
Id. § 19.375.030(2).
Id. § 19.375.010(1).
Id. § 19.375.020(7).
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online services, or any person.”83 Similar to Texas, there are no
published actions under this Washington Biometric Identifiers statute
as of the date of this Note.
IV. THE REUNIFICATION OF PRIVACY AND PUBLICITY: BRINGING
DIGNITY AND AUTONOMY BACK TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A person’s biometric data—their identity—is personal and
extremely sensitive, yet also a commodity and ultimately assignable to
others via consent or contract under current law.84 Although there are
state privacy laws in place that specifically govern the use of a
person’s biometric data, these laws are relatively new and vary greatly
in how, and when, a person can bring a cause of action predicated on
the misuse of their data.85 To address this issue, it should be
considered how the right of publicity, harmonized again with the right
of privacy, could operate as a solution where a state is silent on
biometric data regulation. This common law tort can be used to
evaluate a cause of action under the right of publicity resulting from
the misappropriation of biometric data, or identity.
A. A Brief History of Misappropriation and its Alter Ego: The
Right of Publicity
In the early 1900s, the right of an individual to defend against the
unwanted use of their name or likeness existed under an established
right of privacy.86 It was not until the 1953 decision of Haelan
Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum that the term “right of publicity”
was first coined, although the idea was not new.87 Indeed, by the time
Haelan was decided it was widely recognized that a person had a
property right in their name and likeness, and some states even had
privacy laws specifically including misappropriation language.88
Jennifer Rothman, author of The Right of Publicity explains, “[f]rom
83
84

85
86
87

88

Id. § 19.375.010(8).
See Jennifer E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185,
190 (2012); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt.
g (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (“The interest in the commercial value of a person’s
identity is in the nature of a property right and is freely assignable to others.”).
See supra Part III.
See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80–81(Ga. 1905).
Haelen Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953).
Id.
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the start there was a property-based conception of the right of privacy.
It was understood as a right of self-ownership.”89 This autonomous
right was generally considered “personal and not assignable,”90 and
private or public figures could pursue claims of misappropriation
which inflicted emotional, economic, or reputational injury.91 Even
though the right of publicity was not a novel idea, the expansion of
publicity rights into a quasi-intellectual property right92 was a new
concept, to which the Haelan court gave credence by allowing the
transferability of publicity rights.93
In his Right of Privacy article, Judge Richard Posner discussed the
right of publicity and its importance as a vendible property right.94 He
argued that there are “good economic reasons for assigning the
property right in a photograph used for advertising purposes to the
photographed individual: this assignment assures that the advertiser to
whom the photograph is most valuable will purchase it.
[Alternatively,] [m]aking the photograph the communal property of
advertisers would not achieve this goal.”95 While Judge Posner’s
approach hints at prioritizing the protection of an individual’s
89

90

91
92

93
94
95

JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A
PUBLIC WORLD 48 (2018).
Id. at 47. “The Fifth Circuit in Hanna Manufacturing v. Hillerich & Bradsby
held that a company could not divest a person of his name even if that company
had an exclusive right to its use.” Id. at 48. “The court concluded that [even
though persons had property rights in their names] this property was not
‘vendible in gross’ so as to pass from purchaser to purchaser unconnected with
any trade or business.” Id. at 48–49. See also William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48
CALIF. L. REV. 383, 408 (1960); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 209 (1954). But see Haelen Labs., Inc., 202 F.2d
at 868 (re-interpreting publicity rights to be licensable and assignable).
See ROTHMAN, supra note 89, at 30, 32–33.
Separate from publicity rights, which are individuals’ rights against the
misappropriation or misuse of their likeness and name for another’s benefit
(resulting in a harm), are intellectual property rights, “[a] category of intangible
rights protecting commercially valuable products of the human intellect. The
category comprises primarily trademark, copyright, and patent rights, but also
includes trade-secret rights, publicity rights, moral rights, and rights against
unfair competition.” Intellectual Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019).
See ROTHMAN, supra note 89, at 64.
Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 411 (1978).
Id.; See also ROTHMAN, supra note 89, at 111 (“In the absence of control over
our own identities, we are all like puppets that can be used to speak others’
words and messages.”).
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autonomy by giving them control over who their image is sold to, the
article glosses over the possible emotional and economic harms that
may result from the commodification of a person’s likeness
compounded by the complete transferability of publicity rights.96
Justification for transferability of the right of publicity appears
primarily when viewed as a purely economic right, which endorses the
idea that identity or likeness is akin to a commodity that can be sold to
the highest bidder with control over its future use forfeited. 97 To some,
the very idea of this is degrading.98 Yet, the right of publicity has
grown because of this “singular focus on protecting the economic
value of commodified identity, which can be exploited in a variety of
ways.”99 Identity as a transferrable commodity cuts against the origins
of the right—protection against the misuse of one’s identity or
likeness—and the reason for the right’s existence: the need to protect
one’s autonomy.100 However, this is not to argue for strict nontransferability, but rather in favor of limited transferability. The
limiting of transferability has been used before, specifically with
property that is impossible to transfer or when allowing its transfer
would infringe upon fundamental rights.101
Transferability is not an all or nothing concept.102 “Blood, babies,
historic buildings, human organs, military service, voting rights,
endangered species, and alcohol all have limits placed on their
transferability[,]” ranging from strictly non-transferable to only
partially limited.103 Most of these commodities can be separated from
a person in ways that the identity or likeness cannot be.104 Typically, it
would seem easier to transfer property that is severable from the
person, which strengthens the argument for limiting transferability of
96
97

98

99
100
101
102
103
104

ROTHMAN, supra note 89, at 127–28.
See id. at 121 (discussing parents assigning their children’s right of publicity
resulting in the child’s involuntary forfeiture of that right in the future).
Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 988 (1964) (expounding upon the
conventional notion that “[n]o man wants to be ‘used’ by another against his
will”).
McKenna, supra note 9, at 233.
See ROTHMAN, supra note 89, at 111.
Id. at 125.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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something that is essentially non-severable from the person.105
Moreover, if one contemplates the serious implications a freely
transferable right of publicity would have on daily life, the outlook
becomes bleak. For instance, assume an individual uses an internet
service in a state that allows the free transfer of publicity rights, or is
silent on transferability.106 To use the service, the person has to agree
to certain terms and conditions that enable the internet service to
obtain an exclusive license to the individual’s publicity rights in their
images, or likeness, in perpetuity. In essence, this individual has
signed away their right of publicity. That internet service can now
potentially impose limits on this person’s ability to market themselves
in any other way. Or even worse, it can use their likeness in the future,
without their consent. In this scenario, there are fundamental rights at
risk that perhaps were never considered by that individual before they
joined the internet service.107 Through marketing the unsuspecting
individual’s likeness in accordance with certain groups or services, the
internet service could infringe upon the individual’s freedom of
association.108 A court could conceivably find that, in contracting with
this internet service, the individual voluntarily assigned their publicity
rights and would have to live with the consequences. Recalling John
Stuart Mill’s famous quote, Rothman writes that “it is not freedom, to
be allowed to alienate [one’s] freedom,” but that is what has occurred
since the creation of the IP-like right of publicity.109
B. Right of Publicity Today: “A Haystack in a Hurricane”110
Because the right of publicity was severed from the “personal” tort
of privacy, “[w]hat may have originated as a concern for the right to be
left alone has become a tool to control the commercial use and, thus,
protect the economic value of one’s [identity].”111 The state of disarray
in publicity cases springs from conflicting state laws barring certain
105
106

107
108
109

110

111

Id. at 127.
Contra id. at 119 (Some states, like Nebraska, explicitly prohibit the
transferability of the right of publicity, or at least prohibit the forcible
transference of the right to creditors, like Illinois).
Id. at 128.
Id.
Id. at 129 (quoting JOHN STEWART MILL, ON LIBERTY 101 (Elizabeth Rapaport
ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1978) (1859)).
Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956)
(characterizing the state of publicity rights laws across the United States).
KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 717 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
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plaintiffs’ right to publicity actions for a variety of reasons, including
failure to exploit their identity or commercially profit from it before
the defendant did.112 States whose laws impose this requirement in
particular provide for a cause of action exclusive to celebrities, leaving
non-celebrities without a remedy. Meanwhile, in other states, noncelebrity plaintiffs are allowed to pursue right of publicity claims.113
Indeed, courts themselves grapple to find a meaningful distinction
between the proprietary economic right of publicity (commonly
pursued by celebrities) and the privacy tort of misappropriation
(commonly reserved for non-celebrities). It is not difficult to surmise
that a non-celebrity may suffer economic harm from the exploitation
of his identity, while a celebrity claiming misappropriation may very
well experience emotional or reputational harm from the unauthorized
use of their identity.114 If we persist with this needless dichotomy—
where certain torts are reserved for different classes and statuses—the
inquiry becomes: to what end?
Fraley v. Facebook provided a compromise between these two
ideas in that a non-celebrity could bring a claim for the right of
112

113

114

See, e.g., Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (noting
that plaintiffs should not have to be required to show they commercially
exploited their own property to justify economic injury when defendants exploit
it).
For example, in Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., the federal court
held:
Generally, the greater the fame or notoriety of the identity
appropriated, the greater will be the extent of the economic injury
suffered. However, it is quite possible that the appropriation of the
identity of a celebrity may induce humiliation, embarrassment and
mental distress, while the appropriation of the identity of a
relatively unknown person may result in economic injury or may
itself create economic value in what was previously valueless.
498 F.2d 821, 824 n.11 (9th Cir. 1974).
Likewise, in Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC, the state supreme court said:
While a private citizen may not have the same commercial value in
his or her name and likeness that a celebrity may have, or any
preexisting commercial value in his or her name and likeness at all
for that matter, that would not foreclose that person from pursuing
a cause of action against a wrongdoer who appropriated the
person’s name and likeness for their own commercial gain.
740 S.E.2d 622, 626 (Ga. 2013).
Bullard, 740 S.E.2d at 626.
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publicity where a defendant’s valuation of the user’s identity
demonstrated that their identity had value in the first place.115 In
Fraley, plaintiffs claimed a violation of their right of publicity when
Facebook, through its Sponsored Stories feature, exploited the
plaintiffs’ identity to profit from the value of the plaintiffs’
“endorsement” in Facebook’s advertising scheme.116 The court
required a showing of economic injury, and was persuaded by
plaintiffs’ use of the company’s own statements that Facebook greatly
valued the plaintiffs’ identities in their advertising.117 Even though the
plaintiffs’ identities may not have had commercial value prior to their
engagement with Facebook, by exploiting the plaintiffs’ identities,
Facebook created the presumption of commercial value, thereby
enabling the plaintiffs to show economic injury—at least for purposes
of standing.118
The motley collection of state right of publicity statutes may never
be sorted and unified. Nevertheless, there is hope that courts may
recognize non-celebrities as capable of claiming violations of their
right of publicity,119 and in so doing, perhaps users’ biometric data
could find protection as well.
C. The Right Of Publicity, Unified with the Right of Privacy,
Could Make Rights Over Personal Identity Stronger and
Address Biometric Data Concerns
Shifting the right of publicity from a solely economic property
right—where identity is merely an assignable commodity, “vendible in
gross,”120— back to a personal right of privacy, may help strengthen
autonomy over one’s identity. In this light, identity can continue as a
bargained-for commodity, but the underlying person, or “identity-

115
116
117
118

119
120

Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
Id. at 799.
Id. at 800.
Id. at 800–01. This presumption has been found in other courts presiding over
publicity cases. See Fanelle v. Lojack Corp., No. CIV.A.99-4292, 2000 WL
1801270, at *11 (E.D. Penn. Dec. 7, 2000) (“Inherent in the act of a defendant
using a person’s name, identity, or persona in a commercially advantageous
manner is the presumption that the identity has commercial value . . . . I am
convinced that the right of publicity resides in every person, not just famous and
infamous individuals.”).
See Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 799.
See ROTHMAN, supra note 89, at 59.
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holder,”121 can never be fully divested of ownership. Thus, the
individual is rendered invulnerable to the intentions of the commercial
entity, sometimes referred to as the “publicity-holder,” absent options
to recuperate.122 This would require that some limitations be placed on
the transferability of identity, as property, recognized either by statute
or under common law.
To defend against the misuse of one’s biometric data, the right of
publicity must be reharmonized with the right of privacy. By shifting
the right of publicity away from its current status as an assignable
pseudo-intellectual property right and towards a revitalized dignitary
right of self-ownership, the social interests advanced by both rights—
dignity, autonomy, and economic efficiency—become unified.123 But,
as straightforward as this may sound, the obstacles do not end there.
To effectuate any recognition of biometric data as a protected property
and privacy right under the right of publicity framework, the meaning
of identity or likeness under the right of publicity must be reconfigured
to include biometric data; the commercial value of biometric data in
today’s economy must be recognized, at least as a precautionary
measure for courts that require pre-existing commercial value;124 the
121

122
123

124

This is a phrase used by Rothman in her book, The Right of Publicity, to refer to
the original holder of the identity as opposed to a “publicity-holder,” which
refers to an entity that has been assigned the identity-holder’s right of publicity,
perhaps by contracting for exclusive rights to a person’s likeness, for instance.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 137.
Id. The argument that economic efficiency could be advanced by broader
publicity protections is that users could be more engaged with sharing and
networking without fear of biometric identity theft from companies or entities
purporting a “free” service but really selling users’ data to advertising agencies,
data brokers, and the like. See Privacy Policy, SNAP INC. (Sept. 14, 2020),
https://www.snap.com/en-US/privacy/privacy-policy [https://perma.cc/5KWLAL46] (“Because most of our services are free, we also use some information
about you to try and show you ads you’ll find interesting.”). Also, companies
who are more transparent and give more protections to users could gain a
competitive advantage in the market where states and foreign countries are
trending towards greater privacy and data protections. See Gene Marks,
Biometrics May Answer Your Security Concerns – But Don’t Forget Privacy,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/201
9/apr/04/biometrics-small-business-security-privacy [https://perma.cc/KWR6P5QV].
This seems like it would be challenging to do at this moment in time because of
the lack of transparency between businesses, data brokers, and consumers as to
what the precise value of biometric data is. All we know is the value of
biometric data in the aggregate by looking at how valuable biometric technology
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actual and potential economic, reputational, or emotional injury
resulting from continued misappropriation of our identity must be
appreciated; and finally, limitations must be placed on this reimagined
right of publicity and its scope narrowly tailored to focus on harms
against identity-holders.125 It could be that the best method of
protection over biometric data lies with stronger data privacy laws.
Nonetheless, in the face of a slow-moving legislature, and the reality
that some states may never adopt a biometric data privacy statute on
their own, it is useful to analyze a possible alternative.
1. What Counts as Identity?: “Name and Likeness” Fails to
Capture the Modern Ways We Are Identified
In an action under misappropriation, or the right of publicity,126
“the question before the courts has been . . . whether there has been
appropriation of an aspect of the plaintiff’s identity.”127 In order for
liability to attach, the specific individual’s identity must first be
discernable from the claim.128 Only then can the courts continue with
their analysis.129 The right of publicity has expanded over time to
encompass more than name, photograph, or likeness, for the necessary
“indicia of identity.”130 Now identity can include fabricated “persona,”

125

126

127
128
129
130

has become. See Biometric System Market - Global Forecast to 2024 supra, note
14.
Doing so would limit who could bring suit for a violation of a right of publicity,
thus narrowing the pool of potential litigants.
All references to the right of publicity will also refer to actions under the privacy
tort of misappropriation as many courts use the terms interchangeably. See, e.g.,
Somerson v. World Wrestling Entm’t, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1365 (N.D.
Ga. 2013) (quoting Thoroughbred Legends, LLC v. Walt Disney Co., No. 1:07–
CV–1275–BBM, 2008 WL 616253, at *11 n.13 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 12, 2008)
(“[t]here is no substantive difference between the interests protected by the
common law ‘right of publicity’ and the interests protected by the appropriation
prong of the invasion of privacy tort.”)); Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball,
114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“The common law right of
publicity derives from the fourth category of invasion of privacy identified by
Dean Prosser, described as ‘appropriation’ of a plaintiff’s name or likeness for
the defendant’s advantage.”); see also Posner, supra note 94, at 411(finding the
privacy tort of appropriation and right of publicity basically identical).
Prosser, supra note 90, at 403.
Id. at 404–05.
Id. at 405.
See ROTHMAN, supra note 89, at 97.
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or even a substantial reference to a particular individual that would
allow identification.131
It takes no great stretch of the imagination to connect a person’s
likeness or identity with one’s biometric data; arguably, they are one in
the same. A person’s “likeness” is often comprised of unique physical
or behavioral attributes such that a reasonable person would be able to
see and identify the specified individual. Biometric data, as described
supra in Section II(A), is a reference to the unique physical and
behavioral traits that reliably and accurately identify human beings.132
Some states, like Indiana for example, employ statutory language,
which implies that certain biometric identifiers already qualify for
protection under their statutes.133 The relevant portion of Indiana’s
statutory
right
of
publicity
lists
that
“voice;
[]signature; . . . []distinctive appearance; . . . or []mannerisms” would
all qualify as protected under the statute.134 These attributes are also
considered biometric identifiers because, in addition to fingerprints
and facial recognition mapping, a person’s signature and their
distinctive bodily movements, such as keystrokes or gait, are
measurable, identifiable, behavioral attributes.135 Additionally, in New
York, there is a statute providing for both a civil and a criminal cause
of action regarding a person’s right of publicity.136 The civil statute
prevents the unauthorized use of a person’s voice, a specified
biometric identifier. 137 However, in the event a state statute fails to list
a specific biometric identifier, the inclusion of the word “likeness”
should arguably encompass biometric data, as it is essentially
comprised of a person’s likeness. Where possible, a change should be
made to the state’s publicity statutes to include “biometric indicator,”
which would arguably satisfy the full definition of likeness.

131
132
133
134

135
136
137

Id. at 89.
See Biometrics Review, supra note 8.
IND. CODE § 32-36-1-7 (2020).
Id. Contra 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28 (2020) (prohibiting only the unauthorized
use of name, picture, or portrait; specifically, § 9-1-28.1(a)(2) provides a “right
to be secure from an appropriation of one’s name or likeness”).
See Biometrics Review, supra note 8.
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2020).
Id. § 51.
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2. Biometric Data Has Commercial Value, but No One is
Willing to Share
There are no hard and fast numbers assigning a specific dollar
value to a person’s biometric data.138 While it can be discerned that
biometric data has value based on the skyrocketing market value of the
technology needed to facilitate its use, exact numbers remain elusive.
“[T]he shadowy world of data brokers,”139 “[who] are notoriously
secretive” provides little insight into how much they charge for sharing
sensitive information, or even how many data brokers exist and do
business.140 “Getting answers from the data brokers themselves, as
Congress found, is next to impossible[.]”141 Legislatures agree that
biometric data is being collected and marketed, and acknowledge the
risk of the exploitation of this valuable asset in the statement of intent
portions of their biometric data privacy statutes.142 For example,
Washington and Illinois include legislative intent passages that speak
to the presumption of a risk of harm, or even a particularized harm, to
citizens whose biometric data was vulnerable to collection and
misuse.143 By acknowledging this risk, the legislatures are implying
that biometric data has an innate value, or worth, to the owner. If more
courts, like the Fraley court, recognized the inherent commercial value
of biometric data, then demonstrating economic harm would not be
such an arduous task. In acknowledging this inherent value, users
would be able to substantiate the claim that biometric data has preexisting commercial value and is therefore capable of exploitation.
138
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At least, not that this author could find while scouring the web.
See Yael Grauer, What Are ‘Data Brokers,’ and Why Are They Scooping up
Information About You?, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 27, 2018, 10:00 AM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bjpx3w/what-are-data-brokers-and-how-tostop-my-private-data-collection [https://perma.cc/YJ7P-LBK2].
Paul Boutin, The Secretive World of Selling Data About You, NEWSWEEK: TECH.
& SCI. (May 30, 2016, 2:30 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/secretive-worldselling-data-about-you-464789 [https://perma.cc/5D6C-YH8N].
Id.
See BI, WASH. REV. CODE. § 19.375.900 (2020) (“[C]ollection and marketing of
biometric information about individuals, without consent or knowledge of the
individual whose data is collected, is of increasing concern.” (emphasis added));
see also Take Control of Your Virtual Identity #GDPR, EUR. COMMISSION (June
2019), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/betapolitical/files/virtual_identity_
en.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4TC-6TJK] (“[Companies]
map
your
virtual
identity . . . . [T]hen monetise your virtual identity for targeted advertising.”).
See supra text accompanying notes 60 & 78.
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Although the proposition of value premised on the magnitude of the
market can be made, it is unclear whether this large aggregate number
would be persuasive enough to establish proof of pre-existing
commercial value.
Weighing biometric data’s benefits to the economy and security
against the potential harm to autonomy still favors limitations on the
commodification of likeness or identity. It is useful to remember that a
partial limitation on the assignability and transferability of one’s
publicity rights, including biometric identifiers, may not have the
impact necessary to chill the market. First Amendment defenses to the
rights of privacy and publicity are avenues that would protect the use
of biometric data in cases of newsworthiness or expressionist works,
which are also very important to our society. Absent tighter
regulations, these First Amendment defenses operate as some of the
only protections given the current disarray of state publicity laws.
Considering the effort and transactional costs involved in litigating
these issues, limiting the transferability of publicity rights remains a
heavy task. 144
It is important to reflect on the societal concerns with the loss, or
substantial decrease, of autonomy over biometric data and the ultimate
goal to have awareness and control over when and how our identities
are used. It is true that to function comfortably in today’s society,
individuals must engage with the internet and social media. However,
it does not follow that in exchange for providing users with a “free”
service, companies should then be able to collect users’ unique and
valuable biometric data, and share it with unknown or undocumented
third party associates.145 Without facing any regulations or compulsion
to disclose, there is no impetus to reveal which third-parties these
companies are selling information to and for what specific purpose.146
In this fashion, lack of knowledge is lack of autonomy because without
knowledge, a person has no power or control over how their biometric
information is shared or used. Every individual has a right of
publicity,147 whether the sale or usage of their biometric data was
144
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See Jennifer Rothman, Rothman’s Roadmap to the Right of Publicity, RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY ROADMAP.COM, https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/ [https://p
erma.cc/G4MP-ZZZW] (illustrating how varied state-to-state right of publicity
and common law misappropriation laws are).
See Privacy Policy, supra note 28.
This is currently the case with the data brokerage market. See Grauer, supra note
139.
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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conducted openly or clandestinely. While it may seem extreme to
completely disallow the assignability of biometric data in return for
use of a service, ultimate control should remain with the “identityholder.”148 If the dissemination of biometric data cannot be regulated
on the front end, then users should at least be provided with an exit
strategy.
One solution, as previously mentioned, may be in acknowledging a
right of publicity action where the user could enjoin the use of their
biometric data, or at minimum, claim damages for its misuse. Another
potential strategy also briefly discussed previously, is a regulatory
solution. This regulatory solution is an exit strategy that would include
the ultimate right to regain control over one’s own data at a time of
their choosing, or at a minimum, the guaranteed and periodic
destruction/anonymization of biometric data, commonly referred to as
the “right to be forgotten.”149 A comprehensive solution, whether
judge-made or regulatory, should begin with an examination of the
regulatory solutions currently in effect, specifically those in the
European Union and California.
V. EIGHT LETTERS MAKE A BIG IMPACT: GDPR AND CCPA’S
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON PRIVACY RIGHTS
The European Union’s GDPR and California’s CCPA are at the
forefront of the global trend to slow the rampant dissemination of
individuals’ biometric and personal data in order to reinforce privacy
rights and address security concerns.150 While the two regulations are
similar, there are differences and takeaways that can be analyzed to
assess how these regulations address concerns for autonomy over
biometric data and whether they are better suited to address those
concerns over a reimagined right of publicity.
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ROTHMAN, supra note 89, at 7.
See Biometric Data and Data Protection Regulations (GDPR and CCPA), supra
note 42.
See Dimitri Sirota, California’s New Data Privacy Law Brings U.S. Closer to
GDPR, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 14, 2019, 2:55 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/1
1/14/californias-new-data-privacy-law-brings-u-s-closer-to-gdpr/
[https://perma.cc/9XUA-HNMK].
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A. The GDPR: EU General Data Protection Regulation is Two
Years Old and Europe is Still Standing
The EU General Data Protection Regulation went into effect in
May of 2018.151 This regulation immediately created “one set of rules
directly applicable in all the European Member States regarding the
protection of personal data.”152 The GDPR protects EU residents’
data—including biometric data—by compelling companies to: (1)
provide users with an opt-in option first before “processing”153 any
data; (2) disclose information about the processing of the user’s data in
“clear and plain language”;154 (3) provide users with the right to object
to any “take-it-or-leave-it” services;155 (4) give users access to all of
their data, and ensure the transferability to the user in portable
electronic format;156 (5) inform the user if their data has been hacked
or “leaked”;157 and (6) grant users’ requests that all their personal data
be deleted, otherwise known as “[t]he right to be forgotten.”158 In
addition to EU Member States, any “[n]on-EU established
organizations will be subject to the GDPR if they process personal
data about EU data subjects. This makes the GDPR a global law.”159 In
some cases, the GDPR has appointed Data Protection Officers as an
enforcement measure to verify that companies are in compliance with
the GDPR.160 Were a company to process an EU resident’s data
151
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See Take Control of Your Virtual Identity #GDPR, supra note 142.
See Biometric Data and Data Protection Regulations (GDPR and CCPA), supra
note 42.
“The term ‘processing’ is very broad. It essentially means anything that is done
to, or with, personal data (including simply collecting, storing or deleting those
data).” Dr. Detlev Gabel & Tim Hickman, Chapter 5: Key definitions –
Unlocking the EU General Data Protection Regulation, WHITE & CASE (Apr. 5,
2019), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/chapter-5-keydefinitions-unlocking-eu-general-data-protection-regulation
[https://perma.cc/NRK5-NUWL].
See Take Control of Your Virtual Identity #GDPR, supra note 142.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The “right to be forgotten” means that EU residents can request a company
delete all of their personal data unless a legitimate reason is presented for its
preservation. Id.
See Biometric Data and Data Protection Regulations (GDPR and CCPA), supra
note 42.
Id. (especially companies having over 250 employees).
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without complying with the GDPR or without the user’s explicit
consent, the company would face serious penalties.161
Unlike the varied methods of relief afforded in state statutes across
the U.S., the GDPR allows all EU residents a private right to lodge a
formal complaint for “material or non-material damage caused by a
data controller or data processors breach of the GDPR.”162 Civil
penalties under the GDPR include a potential fine of €20 million, or
4% of the company’s annual profit.163 A German “social networking
operator was fined €20,000 for failing to secure users’ data.”164 Google
is also facing a $57 million fine for non-compliance with the GDPR’s
transparency and opt-in guarantee.165 Additionally, a data brokering
company was fined €220,000 for “failing to inform citizens that their
data was being processed by the company.”166 The GDPR has been
operating for only two years, but by instituting some serious penalties,
it has already shown that it means business. It is hard to tell at such an
early stage if we can expect the same from California’s newest act.
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Id. This is not without some exceptions. For example, the “biometric
information is necessary for carrying out obligations of the controller or the data
subject in the field of employment, social security and social protection law”;
“to protect the vital interests of the individual and he/she is incapable of giving
consent”; “it’s critical for any legal claims”; there is a public health reason
affecting public interest. Id. Moreover, Member States must conform to these
regulations, but they are allowed “to introduce other limitations regarding the
processing of biometric information.” Id.
Laura Jehl & Alan Friel, CCPA and GDPR Comparison Chart, BAKER &
HOSTETLER LLP 6 (2018), https://www.bakerlaw.com/webfiles/Privacy/2018/Ar
ticles/CCPA-GDPR-Chart.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZF6M-5637].
Id. at 7.
GDPR in Numbers, EUROPA, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/betapolitical/files/infographic-gdpr_in_numbers_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/36VFSGMG]. CNIL, a French data protection watchdog concluded in its report that
there is an “alleged lack of transparency. ‘Essential information, such as the data
processing purposes, the data storage periods or the categories of personal data
used for the ads personalization, are excessively disseminated across several
documents, with buttons and links on which it is required to click to access
complementary information[.]’” Dillet, supra note 22.
See Dillet, supra note 22. Google’s fine is the largest fine under the GDPR to
date. Adam Satariano, Google Is Fined $57 Million Under Europe’s Data
Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/
technology/google-europe-gdpr-fine.html [https://perma.cc/QR92-XR95].
GDPR in Numbers, supra note 164.
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B. California’s 2020 Rollout of the CCPA
“On June 28, 2018, California became the first U.S. state with a
comprehensive consumer privacy law when it enacted the California
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA).”167 This regulation went into
effect January 1, 2020 and aims to protect consumers residing or
domiciled in California. 168 In some ways, the CCPA is similar to the
GDPR in that the main goal of the CCPA is to protect the processing
of personal information capable of identifying a human being.169 One
of the most important provisions from the GDPR, “the right to be
forgotten,” has also made its way to the CCPA, where “a consumer has
the right to deletion of personal information a business has
collected.”170 There is also an important exception to both the CCPA
and the GDPR protection schemes: data that has been de-identified, or
otherwise made anonymous.171 Indeed, if the information can no
longer be connected, or successfully used, to identify an individual,
users would have no need to control that data because their identity or
likeness would not be at stake.
167
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Jehl & Friel, supra note 162, at 1.
Id. Defined as: “California residents that are either: In California for other than a
temporary or transitory purpose. Domiciled in California but are currently
outside the State for a temporary or transitory purpose. Consumers include:
Customers of household goods and services. Employees. Business-to-Business
transactions.” Id. at 2.
Id. The CCPA excludes from “personal information” matters of public record
and other information under the protection of different legislation outside the
regulation’s scope. Id.
Id. at 5. Unlike the GDPR, which sets forth six circumstances under which a
user may request deletion of their data, the CCPA has no prerequisites to users’
data deletion but such requests are subject to exceptions. Id. The regulation does
allow businesses to have some discretion over whether they honor a request,
although revocation of consent should be enough. Id.
See Ribarić & Pavešić, supra note 4, at 296.
The terms de-identification and anonymization are often used
interchangeably, but there is difference between them. Deidentification refers to the reversible (two- directional) process of
removing or obscuring any personally identifiable information
from individual records in a way that minimizes the risk of
unintended disclosure of the identity of individuals and
information about them.
Anonymization refers to an irreversible (uni-directional)
process of de-identification that does not allow the original
personal identifiers to be obtained from de-identified ones.
Id.
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While the GDPR focuses on data processors in the general sense,
meaning that any person or entity can process a resident’s individual
data, the CCPA targets large-scale businesses that utilize data brokers
to engage primarily in the buying and selling of data.172 The Act only
regulates commercial companies that do business in California, or
companies that are under the control, or share common branding with,
a Californian entity. To fall within the scope of the regulation, it must
be shown that the entity also satisfies one of the following
requirements: “Has a gross revenue greater than $25 million. Annually
buys, receives, sells, or shares the personal information of more than
50,000 consumers, households, or devices for commercial purposes.
[Or] [d]erives 50 percent or more of annual revenues from selling
consumers’ personal information.”173 Where the GDPR regulates all
the data controllers and processors established in or providing services
or goods within the EU, it is clear the CCPA is much narrower in
scope. The regulation of the data broker industry, in California alone,
could be immensely helpful in determining how that industry works
and adequately assessing the risk levels associated with the
dissemination of sensitive data.
Another key difference between the two approaches is the ability
to opt out. The GDPR provides users with an opt-out ability, where
data subjects can withdraw consent and “opt-out of processing data for
marketing purposes” at any time. but the option is not as strict as the
CCPA’s. The California law requires action on the part of companies
to “enable and comply with a consumer’s request to opt-out of the sale
of personal information to third parties[.]”174 Additionally, the CCPA
requires that businesses “include a ‘Do Not Sell My Personal
Information’ link in a clear and conspicuous location on a website
homepage.”175
One of the biggest differences between the GDPR and the CCPA is
who may file an action against businesses that allegedly violate the
regulations. Under the CCPA, private individuals generally cannot sue
businesses, but there is an avenue “if there is a data breach, and even
then, only under limited circumstances.”176 Otherwise, it falls to the
172
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Jehl & Friel, supra note 162, at 1–2.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 4.
Id.
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), CA.GOV,
https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa [https://perma.cc/23TM-LEQX] (select the
seventh option entitled “What can I do if I think a business violated the CCPA?”
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California Attorney General to bring an action against businesses.177
Under the GDPR, all EU residents, or “data subjects,” have a right to
compensation from a data processor or controller that violated the
Regulation;178 the subject may institute an action for that
compensation in any competent Member State court where he or she
resides or where the company has an establishment.179
C. The Reimagined Right of Publicity & The CCPA
On its face, California’s Consumer Privacy Act seems to mitigate
some of the concerns surrounding autonomy and biometric data
because it allows users to regain ownership and control of their data.
Because this regulation is in the heart of one of the largest economies
in the world—Silicon Valley in California—there is risk of a chilling
effect on tech companies seeking to innovate through the use of
biometrics.180 Furthermore, because the CCPA only affects large-scale
companies, data brokers, and entities doing business in California, the
effect it will have on the United States is largely unknown. However,
with many tech giants based in California,181 it is possible the effects
of the CCPA will be felt nationwide as companies overhaul their
privacy policies to account for the increased protections of biometric
data.
It is also possible that the CCPA could support the resurgence, or a
reimagined version, of the right of publicity. Instead of eclipsing the
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under the heading “A. GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE CCPA”).
Private individuals
can sue a business if [their] nonencrypted and nonredacted
personal information was stolen in a data breach as a result of the
business’s failure to maintain reasonable security procedures and
practices to protect it. If this happens, [they] can sue for the
amount of monetary damages [they] actually suffered from the
breach or ‘statutory damages’ up to $750 per incident.
Id.
Id. Although private consumers may also file complaints against the businesses
with the California Attorney General in order to initiate the process. Id.
2016 O.J. (L 119) 679 at art. 82.
Id.
See Samantha Ann Schwartz, CCPA Critics Warn Innovation Could Lose Under
the Law. What’s at Stake?, CIODIVE (July 14, 2020), https://www.ciodive.com/
news/california-privacy-security-ccpa/579716/ [https://perma.cc/5BLX-HL5M].
Barbra Murray, Bay Area Tech Giants Expand Across US, COM. PROP.
EXECUTIVE: RES. CTR. (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.cpexecutive.com/post/bayarea-tech-giants-expand-across-us/ [https://perma.cc/DEC7-9LLY].

230

UMass Law Review

v. 16 | 198

right of publicity, the CCPA could work in conjunction with the right
of publicity, by providing evidence of the commercial value of a noncelebrity’s biometric data. Working in concert, the CCPA would
operate as a preventative measure by deterring companies from
usurping user identities, while the right of publicity would operate as
the endgame by enjoining companies’ continued use or control over
users’ identities. The CCPA’s effect on data brokers, with its focus on
transparency and compliance with data privacy and publicity rights,
will shed light on which companies sell biometric data, to whom, and
for what purpose.182
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the spreading chestnut tree
I sold you and you sold me:
There lie they, and here lie we
Under the spreading chestnut tree.183
Given the newness of the CCPA, which went into effect in January
2020, it may be pragmatic to wait and observe any windfall, or fallout,
from this comprehensive privacy statute before deeming it—or the
GDPR—the best possible solution toward granting users increased
autonomy over their biometric data. Perhaps the CCPA will serve as a
model for a nationwide biometric data privacy law and perhaps it will
not. Nevertheless, it will be interesting to see California “serve as a
“laboratory” to address this complex socio-economic issue, “without
risk to the rest of the country.”184 It seems that the CCPA, as well as
the GDPR, will carry out the intent driving the right of publicity:
protect individuals’ rights over their person against another’s
exploitation to their own benefit. This is not an easy path. If these
regulatory efforts do not effectuate a complete solution, a reimagined
right of publicity may be the best option to defend against the
misappropriation of a newly commodified identity.
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See Timothy Tobin et al., The Challenge Ahead – The Impact of the CCPA on
Data Driven Marketing and Business Models, HOGAN LOVELLS (Nov. 30, 2018),
https://www.engage.hoganlovells.com/knowledgeservices/news/the-challengeahead-the-impact-of-the-ccpa-on-data-driven-marketing-and-business-models_1
[https://perma.cc/388P-BZ93].
GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 73 (1949).
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).

